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We humans are good at estimating probabilities. Despite the dauntingly complex
dynamics involved in tossing a die, we readily see that each side has about a one in six
probability of coming up. Michael Strevens’s Tychomancy [Strevens 2013] is about this
ability of ours. Strevens presents a number of inference rules that he suggests guide our
probabilistic judgements. He argues that these rules are (1) innate, (2) reliable, and (3)
crucial to many areas of science.
To illustrate the last point, consider evolutionary theory. It has long been recognized
that fitness is a probabilistic matter. There is no logical or physical guarantee that faster
wolves will catch more deer. If slow wolves frequently come across old or wounded deer
while fast wolves happen to forage in areas devoid of deer, it may well be the slower
wolves that prevail. But we can see that this is an unlikely scenario. We know that in
normal environments, faster wolves have a greater probability of catching fast-moving
deer.
Another example Strevens discusses in some detail is Maxwell’s 1859 discovery of the
Maxwell-Boltzmann law, according to which the velocity of gas molecules in equilibrium
has a Gaussian probability distribution in each direction. As Strevens points out,
Maxwell’s original derivation of the distribution, from apparently a priori symmetry
assumptions, is not only unsatisfactory, but doesn’t even do justice to Maxwell’s own
evidence. Maxwell knew the probabilities, but he didn’t know how he knew.
Tychomancy is a welcome philosophical contribution to an important topic. Probabilis-
tic judgements are central to our scientific and everyday understanding of the world, but
we know little about how these judgements are formed and what makes them reliable.
Strevens addresses these questions in a pleasantly accessible but careful style, combining
insights from child psychology, the history of science, and the mathematics of probability.
So what guides our probabilistic judgements? From examples like dice one might think
they are directly based on physical symmetries, following some principle of indifference.
But things are not that simple. We know that a die tossing machine is unlikely to produce
the usual probabilistic patterns, despite the physical symmetries of the die. We also
realize that if a die is rolled without shaking, then some outcomes are at a disadvantage.
Moreover, it is not obvious how physical symmetries enter into evolutionary explanations,
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or how indifference could directly justify Maxwell’s Gaussian (and thus non-uniform)
velocity distribution.
What is missing in the indifference-based picture are considerations about the dynamics
of the relevant systems. According to Strevens, the central principles that drive our
probabilistic judgements are not traditional principles of indifference but what he calls
principles of equidynamics. He expresses these principles in a number of rules, tailored to
different types of process and different questions. Among other things, there is a stirring
rule, a microdynamic rule, an equilibrium rule, a uniformity rule, a majority rule, and
a microequiprobability rule. Readers familiar with Strevens’s earlier work will not be
surprised that the “method of arbitrary functions” figures prominently in setting up and
justifying these rules.
Consider the process of shaking a die. Each collision between the die and the container
causes a reorientation of the die in which the new orientation is sensitive to fine details
about the previous orientation. After a few collisions, the die’s approximate initial
orientation has become irrelevant to its new orientation: the information that the
die started with, say, the six facing up entails nothing about its orientation after a
few collisions; to compute which side is now facing up we would have to know the
precise initial orientation, as well as precise details about the initial position etc. Slight
differences to these initial conditions lead to different sides facing up after a bit of shaking.
More specifically, the space of possible initial conditions can be partitioned into small,
contiguous regions such that any probability distribution that is roughly uniform over
each of these regions evolves, by the dynamics of the shaking, into a distribution that
assigns to each side an approximately equal probability of facing up.
It is tempting to think that these observations somehow explain or “ground” the
probabilities involved in shaking and tossing a die. More importantly for the present
topic, they suggest a way of coming to know the probabilities. According to Strevens,
the process can be divided into two steps. First, we recognize that the die’s final
orientation is the product of a series of collisions in each of which the post-collision
state is determined by independent and essentially random details about the original
state. The die’s dynamics therefore approximates a Markov process, which means that
after sufficient shaking, the probabilities over the die’s orientation must reach a unique
equilibrium. Here we apply Strevens’s equilibrium rule. In a second step, we can use the
uniformity rule to infer that in equilibrium each side has an equal probability of facing
up. The rule says that whenever a system’s short-term dynamics preserves uniformity
over certain variables, then we may assume that the equilibrium distribution is uniform
over these variables. (See pp.101–106 for the details.)
A remnant of indifference is still required. We have to assume that small variations in
the initial conditions have approximately equal probability – in Strevens’s terminology,
that the initial conditions are microequiprobable. This is licensed by another rule, the
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microequiprobability rule. The rule says that we may (defeasibly) assume that “standard
variables” have an approximately uniform probability distribution over small intervals.
Here, standard variables are “roughly, variables that measure physical quantities in
proportion to the SI units” (p.69). The restriction is necessary to avoid Bertrand-type
paradoxes.
So indifference assumptions are still required, but they play a much smaller role than
one might have thought. We don’t have to start with the assumption that each side
of a die has an equal probability of facing up. Since the dynamics of shaking ensures
that any reasonably smooth probability distribution over initial conditions leads to an
approximately uniform distribution over final orientation, we only need to assume that
small variations among the initial conditions have roughly equal probability. What’s
more, Strevens shows that these applications of the microequiprobability rule can often
be justified by further dynamical considerations. For example, if the initial conditions
are produced by processes that are subject to perturbations by noise, it is reasonable to
assume that minor variations of an initial condition should have roughly equal probability.
Of course, nothing comes from nothing. At some point, smoothness in the distribution of
standard variables – for example, in the parameters of noise – must be taken for granted.
When we think about dice, we realize not only that each toss comes with an approxi-
mately uniform probability for the six outcomes, but also that the outcomes of different
tosses are stochastically independent. For example, we judge that the probability of
getting two sixes in a row is about 1/36. Assuming a deterministic dynamics, this requires
that the initial conditions for the two tosses are suitably uncorrelated. It is not actually
required that the probabilities over initial conditions are independent, which would be
implausible. Rather, it is enough that the joint distribution over pairs of initial conditions
is sufficiently smooth. Once again this assumption can be justified by further dynamical
considerations, as Strevens argued in detail in ch.3 of Bigger than Chaos [Strevens 2003].
In Tychomancy, the required assumption about joint distributions is folded into
the microequiprobability rule, by stipulating that a probability measure qualifies as
microequiprobable only if it is approximately uniform over small, contiguous regions in
the compound space of initial conditions for several trials. It would have been more
perspicuous, I think, to give a separate name to the independence assumption. As it
stands, the assumption has a tendency to slip under the radar – at least for the reader,
but arguably also for Strevens himself. One sign of this is that Strevens’s own use of
the term ‘microequiprobable’ seems to fluctuate between the stronger sense in which it
entails smoothness over joint distributions and the weaker sense in which it doesn’t. A
more substantive problem arising from the neglect of independence will be mentioned
below.
Like most of the literature on arbitrary functions, I have focused on comparatively
simple dynamical systems like dice. Strevens deserves credit for pushing the method a lot
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further, showing how the kinds of considerations that apply to dice and roulette wheels
might carry over to the kinetic theory of gases, to population dynamics, or to weather
models. There is a lot to learn from these discussions. Nonetheless, I want to use the
remainder of this review to focus on two general aspects of Strevens’s treatment where I
think it might be useful to explore alternatives.
The first concerns the status of Strevens’s inference rules. Strevens does not pretend
that his rules are complete or deductively valid. (They are clearly neither.) Given these
concessions, more could have been said about what role the rules are meant to play.
Are they supposed to be heuristics that we apply to arrive at probabilistic judgements?
According to Strevens, even 8-month old infants use equidynamic reasoning, so the rules
are presumably not meant to encode explicit steps of reasoning. Are we meant to be
actively guided by the rules, or is the hypothesis merely that whenever we have evidence
for the premises, then (ceteris paribus) we tend to come to believe the conclusion?
These questions become even more pressing given that Strevens’s rules are not sufficient
to account even for the main examples in his study. As we saw above, application of the
uniformity rule presupposes that we can figure out a system’s short-run dynamics, which
is not given to us by any of Strevens’s rules. Similarly, to make use of the equilibrium
rule we need to know how long a die or an urn must be shaken in order for each outcome
to have an equal probability. In both cases, Strevens appeals to a largely unexplained
skill of probabilistic dynamics. Probabilistic dynamics must also be invoked to generate
probabilistic judgements about outcomes if a shaking or shuﬄing has not gone on for
long enough to apply the equilibrium and uniformity rules. For actual drawings from an
urn or a deck of cards, this is the rule rather than the exception. Yet another appeal to
probabilistic dynamics is needed to account for Maxwell’s realization that correlations
between the velocity components of gas molecules become disassociated in the coarse of
several collisions. Given all these uses of probabilistic dynamics, one would rather like to
know more about this ability, and one wonders how much work it leaves for Strevens’s
inference rules.
Strevens hints at the idea that what drives probabilistic dynamics is a kind of mental
simulation or modelling of the relevant process. For example, to apply the equilibrium
and uniformity rule, we might represent the shaking die as a Markov process. The idea
is appealing, and might be worth exploring further. If our probabilistic judgements are
largely based on the use of stochastic models, new questions would come into focus that
presently play little role in Strevens’s account. Most obviously, there would be questions
about model selection and parameter estimation. The answer to these might supersede
many of Strevens’s rules: if such-and-such evidence makes it reasonable to represent a
process by a certain stochastic model, and that model attributes a given probability to
an outcome, then the evidence also serves as the basis for the probability judgement.
Closer to the level of implementation, we can ask how a cognitive system can realistically
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employ stochastic models. In each case, one might hope to draw on developments in
machine learning, where the use of “generative models” has become a de facto standard.
I am also not convinced that the relevant models have to be dynamical – in other words,
that the assumption of a shuﬄing dynamics is as central to our probability judgements as
Strevens suggests. Imagine you find a well-used (standard) deck of cards in an abandoned
building in a drawer. What’s the probability that the 10th card from the top is the ace
of spades? About 1/52, I would say, even if I know little about the process that gave the
stack its order. Or consider the usual explanation of why quantitative features tend to
have a Gaussian frequency distribution. The explanation is that the relevant features are
determined as the sum or average of a large number of independent factors, and summing
or averaging independent distributions tends to produce a Gaussian distribution. This
strikes me as a good explanation, and as a useful guide for estimating probabilities, but
it is not dynamical.
The second point where I think it might be worth investigating alternatives to Strevens’s
treatment concerns the interpretation of probability – a topic on which Strevens tries to
maintain an “ecumenical agnosticism” (p.55). At first glance, this may seem puzzling.
One might think that before we ask what guides judgements of a certain kind, or what
makes them reliable, we ought to get clear about their content. How can we tell whether
a rule generally leads from true premises to true conclusions if we don’t know what
it would mean for the probabilistic conclusions to be true? The relevant probability
statements are clearly not statements about “objective chance” in the metaphysician’s
sense in which non-trivial chance requires indeterminacy in the basic laws of physics. On
the other hand, Strevens insists that he is not just talking about degrees of belief. The
probabilities in question are meant to be “physical”, as witnessed by the fact that they
are empirically discoverable, arise from physical features of dynamical processes, and
are closely related to relative frequencies. There is indeed a growing consensus that we
need such a conception of probability, even though none of the usual “interpretations of
probability” seem to fit the job. On this background, Strevens’s procedure to investigate
probabilistic inferences without first settling on an interpretation actually makes sense.
We know better what kinds of observations support probability judgements than what
these judgements mean. Indeed, we might hope to get a firmer grip on the interpretation
of probabilistic judgements by looking at what sorts of observations count as evidence
for or against them.
Towards the end of Tychomancy, in chapter 12, Strevens drops his agnosticism and
puts forward his own interpretation of physical probability, also outlined in his recent
paper [Strevens 2011]. The starting point is the above-mentioned observation that the
dynamics of certain physical processes – which Strevens calls microconstant – carries any
smooth distribution PI over initial conditions to approximately the same distribution PO
over outcomes. PO can then be identified with the physical probability of the outcomes
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provided that the actual frequencies of initial conditions approximate a microequiprobable
distribution, and that they would continue to do so under a variety of counterfactual
circumstances.
Here the neglected independence condition turns out to complicate the picture. Ac-
cording to Strevens, microequiprobability over initial conditions requires a smooth joint
distribution for selections of two or three or . . . trials, which on the proposed interpretation
of probability requires an approximately smooth joint frequency distribution for such
selections. That is, if we map out the frequencies of initial conditions in all suitable
selections of, say, 100 die tosses, we should find no correlations between slight variations
of the 100 initial conditions. The problem is that this requires a very large overall number
of die tosses – arguably more than there are in the history of the world. Evidently
the problem only gets worse if we consider not tosses of ordinary dice, but tosses of
sixteen-sided dice or other uncommon probabilistic setups. Here Strevens hopes to get
help from counterfactuals about scenarios in which there are many more instances of
the relevant setup, but that threatens to bring on board many of the problems plaguing
hypothetical frequentism.
Strevens’s interpretation also has surprising consequences for young infants. Recall
that according to Strevens, 8-month-old children perform equidynamic reasoning. The
evidence is, for example, that when balls are drawn from an urn, 8-month-olds are more
surprised by non-representative samples. What’s more, their expectations about the
outcome takes into account the process of sampling. Some form of dynamical reasoning
therefore seems to take place. But what is the end product of that reasoning? Strevens
speaks of “the conception of probability found in infants’ equidynamic judgments”. But
do 8-month-olds really have a full-blooded Strevensian concept of physical probability?
Do they really come to believe – if only in some implicit, non-conceptual manner – that
the sampling process is microconstant and that the actual and counterfactual frequency
distribution over initial conditions is approximately microequiprobable? These claims
certainly go far beyond the evidence from psychology. One might argue that all the
evidence actually supports is that the infants acquire precise and stable degrees of belief,
reflected in their expectations about frequencies.
The difficulty of defining a suitable concept of physical probability, together with the
issues raised by attributing any such concept to young infants, may justify another look
at the projectivist interpretation of probability defended by de Finetti [1937], Skyrms
[1984] and Jeffrey [2004]. Crudely speaking, on this account the function of physical
probability statements is not to represent special probabilistic facts in the world; rather,
it is to express (and perhaps recommend) certain stable degrees of belief. The account
does not require de Finetti’s radical subjectivism, on which all coherent degrees of belief
are equally good. We can accept that observations about dynamics, frequencies, and
other physical facts tend to make some attitudes rational and others irrational. The
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projectivist interpretation goes nicely with the above idea that we use stochastic models
to think about physical processes, as endorsing a model gives rise to precise and resilient
degrees of belief.
From this perspective, justifying our probabilistic inferences means to explain how
observations about symmetries and dynamics can warrant representing the relevant
process by a certain stochastic dynamical model. As before, the change in perspective
might bring into focus some interesting questions currently not addressed by Strevens.
For example, we may ask why physical probability judgements are useful in the first
place. Why model the dynamics of dice or gas molecules as a stochastic process, if the
underlying dynamics is deterministic? The obvious answer is that going probabilistic is a
means to achieve simplicity and generality, abstracting away from complex lower-level
details. This is useful not only because the microphysical details are often hard to know,
but also because they would obscure important higher-level regularities. Our ability to
form probabilistic judgements might therefore be seen as part of a more general ability
to employ abstract, high-level models.
The central issues discussed in Tychomancy still arise: How do we construct probabilistic
models? Why are these models so successful? What kinds of physical facts make it
reasonable to use a given model? We are still far from a full answer to these questions.
But Strevens takes us a lot closer than we were before.
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